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Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence 'Unlikely Alliances' Video Transcript

TEXT—In Boston, youth homicide increased 230% – from 22 victims in 1987 to 73 victims in 1990 – the city’s bloodiest year on record.

VOICE OVER HEADLINES:

- BS:** All of the kids, thought that they were going to die, they were going to be targets, that if they lived to tomorrow, it was a good thing.
- RF:** When I saw the dead bodies out in the streets and the shootings that we went to every night, they were getting worse and worse, and it was something that we never saw before.
- RM:** The gang unit in 1990 would be 5:30 get your coffee, 6:00, 6:15 be at your first shooting. 7:30, be at your second shooting; maybe 8:30, 9:00 be at another incident.
- MB:** The kids were running around with .9 mm's and 12 gauges and submachine guns, but the kids weren't shooting us. They were really killing each other.
- TW:** We were told by the powers that be, at that point in time "We don't have gangs in Boston." I mean we were just ignoring the problem.

TITLE—UNLIKELY ALLIANCES

The Story of The Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence

Boston Police Department

- PE:** We were totally unprepared for the gang wars and the emergence of crack cocaine. And our cities just became war zones in many respects. And Boston was no different. We would have as many as five and six shootings a night and

we were just racing from one shooting to another and being totally reactive. And it was incredible frustration, a tremendous amount of finger-pointing as to who was at fault and a lot of desperation. A lot of young people being killed, and "how do we stop this?", a lot of "get tough" rhetoric from the Police Department.

MB: You had situations where particularly males, young black males, you know, were being stopped, and what initially was supposed to be a pat-frisk to feel for a weapon or anything bulky became a full-fledged search, where young men complained about, you know, they had to drop their pants in the streets. You know, it got a little out of control.

RM: We were making more seizures of firearms, we were making more seizures of drugs, we were making more arrests and we were incarcerating more individuals. But the violence problem was not subsiding, nor was it even leveling off, it was getting worse.

Trial Court of the Commonwealth Dorchester District Court

BF: We didn't talk to one another. Basically it was two separate jobs. Police did their job, we did our job. And the way we did our job was to sit inside the building and wait for the probationers to come in and report to us.

BS: You didn't think, you didn't feel, you became numb to the homicides, you became numb to the apathy, you became numb to the total desolation of the individuals who were sitting in your office. You didn't care. You didn't HAVE to care. All you had to do was satisfy the problems in the file, rather than what the problems the file represented.

BF: It was a turf situation. In other words, once somebody was placed on probation, they belonged to us, and it was our job to rehabilitate them. And it was our job to advocate for them. It wasn't anybody else's job, it was our job.

Streetworker Program Boston Community Centers

TL: With my program being new, the Street Workers being a new program on that level and with traditional agencies, like the police and probation, I think we kind of butted heads at one point because the kids would tell us one version. The courts and police who had been there for a while, would give us another version and I think we were seen as the ones who were trying to protect the kids -- which I think we were, because they were telling us a version and we would simply somewhat fall into that version only.

EH: All these calls are coming in for these emergency areas. People are getting shot here, getting shot there. The police and the courts and the Streetworkers and the clergy and none of us were working together.

TL: We were IT. We were the savior we thought. Because the first year that the Streetworkers were implemented, the homicides were cut in half. You couldn't tell us we weren't IT. You couldn't put me in this room without coming in sideways because my head was so big. But then, the next year, the following year when the homicides went back up again, we realized that something is wrong.

African-American Faith Community

JB: There were a lot of ministers who would say, "You know, this is not my ministry. These are not young people that I deal with. There are so many other kids that are good kids and we need to be dealing with the good kids. Why are you going to deal with these kids?" There were people, during that time, who would say that the generation that was experiencing all this violence was a lost generation.

ER: The criminality and the violence of a largely black youth had to be challenged from WITHIN the black community and there needed to be an equally vigorous fight waged politically against the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by a largely Irish police department. Two issues. Two challenges.

TEXT—The Boston Strategy began as a series of small steps taken by individuals desperate to stop the killing.

JB: And at the time the church doors were closed, and I took it as a sign. And I realized that although these kids were just a few years younger than I was at the time, that the gulf between us was vast. I didn't know them; they didn't know me, I didn't understand their world, they didn't understand mine. And if we were going to do anything about it, somebody had to take the step.

ER: What we would do is take clergy into the streets and neighborhoods to meet young people who lived in a world that began at 9:00 at night and went until 5:00 in the morning. There was a whole 'nother twilight zone that existed, in which lived hundreds, if not thousands of children who were at risk, that most upstanding middle-class black clergy didn't know anything about.

JB: That first night we came across these two groups of kids, and they both had Rottweiler dogs with them, so they were sort of barking at each other. And the kids were like posturing themselves around and what-not. And I remember when we happened on them, it was all sort of all-of-a-sudden. They looked at us, we looked at them, and we didn't know WHAT to do. And I remember Gene saying something like, "What's up?" And he walks over to them because he knew one of the kids in one of the gangs. The other group immediately turned and walked away. And then we had a chance to talk to these kids.

RH: And I've got to be perfectly honest and say I was scared. You worry about retaliation, and could something happen while you're there? Could you end up getting caught in a cross-fire again? and so on. But I think there was very much the sense that "You said you were available, now here's the opportunity now. Are you going to go?"

JB: It's one thing to sort of be in your household, hear about it, and then comment on it. It's another thing to be out there, in the mix, every night, hearing the pops of gunfire, or knowing that in any given emergency room in a hospital, you'd see half a dozen to a dozen kids laying out on gurneys crying out for Mama. It's quite a different thing. And once I was able to immerse myself into that, then I was able to have a little bit more understanding of what a police officer had to go through.

RM: At the same time we were out walking the streets, working the gang areas, making visits with probation, there was another group of adult males that were out there, actively working the street. And again, in most major cities in this country, the chief antagonist of the police department, especially in the urban and minority communities, is the minority clergy or the black clergy. We were running into the Ray Hammonds, the Jeff Browns, the Gene Rivers', out in the street at night. We'd be walking School and Thane, or up in the area of Four Corners, and they're coming in another direction. This would be a Tuesday night, 11:30, 12:00 at night, not many people out. They were doing the same thing we were, in a different manner. They're attempting to get the kids off the street; we were attempting to get the kids off the street.

PE: The clergy started taking to the streets and they started bumping into police officers; they started to have conversations, and I think the more they talked, the more they realized that they had a lot more in common than they had at odds or differences in how to deal with the issues that they faced on a daily basis on the streets.

ER: You see, the innovations didn't happen in the suites. The real action with Bobby Merner, Bobby Frattalia and Freddy Waggett, happened at the street level. It was

kind of a macho street corner, mano-a-mano, kind of dialog, where there was mutual suspicion at the street level. But what was also significant is that there was a level of reality because you were playing at the most serious level which is where people live and die.

NEW SECTION

RH: I think there were a number of things that contributed to the collaboration with the police. But, in my own mind, a major turning point was Morning Star.

RH: In 1992, when a funeral was being held for a young man who had been killed in a gang-related shooting. During that funeral, another fellow came in, and ended up being attacked by a group that was there. He was stabbed several times, but fortunately survived. A gun was shot off in the church, and it created just complete chaos. And of course, it led to something like 400 mourners stampeding out of the service.

ER: And so Morning Star was the wakeup call to the City, it was the wakeup call most forcefully to the faith community. We had not collectively engaged the issue of youth violence. And for the first time, the entire faith community was forced, because the church had failed to take their message to the street, and as a result the street had brought its message into the church with brutal clarity.

RH: It was also very clear to us, in the wake of Morning Star, WE had to change the way that we do things. So I think you had a situation where two institutions recognized they really had to change the way they do business. And it was very clear that when we were talking about safety and security, we can't do it by ourselves; the police were very clear about the fact that they could not do it by themselves. If they could not enlist the support of the community, they would always be seen as an invading army and they would always be resisted. So I think those were some of the factors that led, to some extent, both sides to be both open to a new kind of dialog and to initiate it.

ER: There was a recognition that there needed to be a higher level of collaboration among the activist black clergy, the police at the street level, and the probation officers who were processing these young people every day in the courts. And so there was a major attitudinal shift with regards to the violence across the black community. That this could not be tolerated. That there had to be a zero tolerance posture, vis-à-vis such senseless violence.

TEXT—Two days after Morning Star, Reverend Rivers drafted the first 10 Point Plan and the Ten Point Coalition was born.

This group of concerned clergy and lay people dedicated themselves to mobilizing resources and reaching out to young people at risk.

RH: There were three programs, you might say, that developed. One was for churches across the city and even suburban churches, to come together across lines of denomination, and so on, just to continue to really pray about this situation. The second was to get people on the streets working with young people, talking with them, building relationships with them. And the third was to begin to start developing some relationships with the educational system.

JB: Beyond what we've written, I think the heart and soul of Ten Points is no less than the resurrection of the community and the restoration of neighborhoods. We weren't going to stop until that began to happen.

NEW SECTION

GB: When I first started, basically crime was just my thing. I mean, I was intent on catching criminals, you know, arresting people with guns, doing drugs, murder, what have you. And then I started to see, "Well, you know, that's all good, fine and good, but that's after the crime had occurred," and then I started to believe that well, maybe there's something else I can do.

BS: What I found out in the summer of 1992 was the immense power Probation has and had in the community on the kids who were most likely to do the shooting or most likely to be shot, because most of them were on probation. Most of them had already been before the court; most of them were already court-involved; most of them we had intimate knowledge of, we just didn't know what we could do with them.

TW: And I knew that we had to do something different, we had to do something more. And that's when a lot of us started to get together, like Billy Stewart, we had detectives like Bobby Merner, Bobby Frattalia, Freddy Waggett. Richie Skinner was another probation officer in Dorchester Court, and those are the guys that we got together with and we said "We've got to do something else."

GF: You really did have street level officers and probation officers and DYS officers that sat together and said "This is crazy. We've got to do something. If you have all this information, you should be talking to us. You should be riding with us. You should be hanging with us because we have to share what I know with what

you know. If you have fifty percent of the picture and I have fifty percent of the picture, we could get together and share that so we both have a clear picture of what's going on."

RF: They came to me and said, "Richie Skinner, etc., would like to ride around with us at night because they have a lot of these kids that are gang members on probation." And I said, "That's a great idea. If you people want to do it, go right ahead." And basically, that was kind of the start of Night Light.

RM: At the time when we started to do it, this wasn't a plan. It was, you know, we have a couple of dozen kids that we looked at right away that we knew were causing major problems within the community. Probation had those individuals under certain conditions, so we looked at it initially as "OK, let's take them out. Let's take them out of the community, let's make them comply, and if they don't comply, we'll bring it back to the judges and we'll put it back in the judges' lap."

TEXT—Operation Night Light pairs one probation officer with two police officers to make surprise visits to the homes, schools, and worksites of high-risk probationers during the non-traditional hours of 7 p.m. to midnight.

VOICE BEGINS OVER TEXT:

BS: In the middle of Nelson Street, at quarter of nine on November 12, 1992, I see across the width of a neighborhood city street, four kids standing there. All of them are on probation. Two of them are on probation with me. So I walked around the police tape, behind the crowd and walked up behind them and tapped one of them on the side of the head, kid by the name of Jimmy. I said, "Jimmy, what's up? How are you? What are you doing out at night? You're supposed to be in."

And he turned, and his eyes fell out of head. "What are you doing here? What's Probation doing here at night." And I told him I was riding in the "5-0". Quote, unquote, riding in the "5-0". And his answer was back, "You can't do that. That's not fair. Probation and police don't work together. That's foul." And my comment was, "If you don't think it's fair, then that's what we're going to do. Now you have 30 seconds to tell me what happened here."

RM: That evolved into individuals that started to comply because they thought we were checking on them. Now, from an intervention standpoint, that if they're not out there, they're not perpetrating. But they're not also victims. If they're not standing there, they can't get shot at, they can't get stabbed, they can't get

robbed. And from a prevention standpoint -- and again, this wasn't a master plan -- if there's no shooting, if there's no stabbing, if there's no robbery, if there's no drug rip, well then there's no retaliation.

OPERATION NIGHT LIGHT FOOTAGE

VOICE OVER:

BS: I think it works all the time, because, again, it's instant accountability. If you're not in, that's fine. I've gone into houses and found kids not home. But I've also left them a card on their pillow and said, "Be in my office tomorrow morning by 9:00." If they're not in at 9:00, I send them a surrender notice. They will be in within the next week. Within a week they will be held accountable for their failure to comply with the terms of probation.

OPERATION NIGHT LIGHT FOOTAGE

VOICE OVER:

RM: When we first started to go out, we'd knock on the door. We'd talk to parents, we'd talk to maternal grandmothers, we'd talk to aunts, uncles, grandfathers, fathers. And the individuals weren't home. We would continue to visit even while they weren't home. And the mother would -- this was a non-controversial visit. "What did he do?" "He didn't do anything. I'm his probation officer, I'm Mr. Skinner, I'm Mr. Stewart, this is Detective Frattalia, this is Detective Waggett. We just want to make sure that he's not giving you a hard time and that he's complying. You know, he's supposed to be home." "Yes, I do. Well, as a matter of fact, he's not going to school either," the mother tells you, or the aunt tells you. "Oh, he's not?" So Richie Skinner or Billy Stewart would leave their card, "have him call me." These kids didn't want to please the police, but they sure wanted to please their probation officers.

TITLE--US ATTORNEY FOR MASSACHUSETTS

DS: It was astounding to me when I saw that, the number of people that were dying, an unacceptable number of people who were dying, young people who were dying. Everyone knew that, but when you see the statistics that are staring you in the face, then you say to yourself, "I don't care what kind of resources are needed, we'll bring in DEA, we'll bring in the US Attorney's office, we'll mobilize every resource that we can in that community, and we'll work together to stop young people from dying in that community." It is unacceptable, as a civilized society, to permit those number of people to be murdered.

PE: There was a willingness for them to really listen to the locals, as opposed to dictating to the locals. And I think that made all the difference in the world in our city, the willingness to actually listen to street-level cops as to "This is what's going on in the neighborhood, and we can make a difference if we go after these individuals." And that was a tremendous change for the Justice Dept. in my mind.

DS: We decided early on, for example, that from a law enforcement point of view, we ought to be focusing on organized violent gangs. Guns were very important. Sending the clear message that gun traffickers and repeat violent offenders who carry guns will be targeted and prosecuted. And that violence was going to attract everyone's attention in an organized way.

NEW SECTION

GB: The gang members were operating on anonymity so you know, until someone identifies them, they think they can get away with anything they want.

TEXT–The changing environment within the BPD allowed for the creation of the Youth Violence Strike Force.

This unit, with members from a variety of law enforcement agencies, developed the concept of a focused crackdown on repeat offenders.

In 1995 the Strike Force, Streetworkers, Ten Point Coalition, and Probation joined forces with David Kennedy and his Harvard team, creating the Boston Gun Project Working Group.

This group met regularly at the Strike Force and asked two fundamental questions: what is driving the violence, and what, if anything, could be done to stop it?

TL: I mean we sat down for a while, a number of us, and went over every homicide case that happened I think within a three or four year period. Where they happened, the rivalries involved, all the gangs. We did some very specific research. It was very interesting and very specific to what we needed to deal with on the street level.

DS: And one of the things that emerged very quickly was there was a hard-core number of repeat violent offenders in the City of Boston that were causing a disproportionate amount of problems. The vast majority of people were law-abiding, and even the vast majority of people who might be considered gang members, many of those people were hangers-on that needed to get a strong message that unless they changed their pattern of behavior, their criminal activity, they were going to go away for a long period of time.

GF: Most of the kids, neighborhood based kids, are very scared to go to federal prison. They want nothing to do with federal prosecution. If they get time in a state prison, they go to state prison, they see their friends, they have visitors. They go to a federal prison, they're out in places like Kansas, Texas, all over the country. They don't have visitors. Federal time is real time. Ten years is ten years.

DS: In the gang arena, for example, there were a number of gangs in Boston. There were probably 1200-1300 young people who were gang-involved. But all gangs were not the same. And what we decided to do was to target, and to focus, and be strategic. To try to go after those gangs that were causing the most problem. We couldn't do them all, but we had the sense that between the DA's office and the Boston Police, and federal law enforcement agencies, FBI, DEA, ATF, if we could work together, we could try to target those gangs that were most violent.

TITLE: Operation Cease Fire: Tough Action Against Gangs

TEXT—The Cease Fire strategy, developed by the Gun Project Working Group, was based on statistical research, street intelligence, and the anti-gang tactics developed by the Youth Violence Strike Force.

BS: The number one problem that we had to overcome was, "How do we get the message out of the power that is sitting at this table? How can we uniformly get this out to the kids that we're talking about, to tell them 'Hey, we're all sitting together now.'" Because they weren't in the meeting rooms with us, filling in all the blanks to the initial foundation of Cease Fire. And yet, when we found out we could work together, we had no outlet to get the message out to the kids "Hey, we're sitting talking about you." So the next logical step was "Well, an educated consumer. Let's bring them in."

MB: We get a group of kids down, they've been messing up in a particular area, we say, "Look, we're calling a truce for three months. If the drug activity stops, if the gunplay stops, you'll have no problems with us. If it continues after three months, then all these agencies are coming after you, and we're coming after you

as one, and we ARE going to get you. Those of you on probation, we'll have your probation officers violate you. Those of you who are on parole from DYS, we'll have you violated, but we WILL get you off the streets." It's a warning, it's a cease-fire. Time out. Time out.

TEXT—Following the success of the initial Cease Fire street interventions, the partners began to bring their message to the schools.

SINGLETON/ STEWART AT CEASE FIRE WITH LIVE AUDIO

RH: There's a kind of tough guy/nice guy approach, but it doesn't break down that simply, because they also hear that police officer saying, "Ours is the department that not only wants to arrest you if you cause trouble, but wants to provide camperships and scholarships."

REVEREND BROWN AT CEASE FIRE WITH LIVE AUDIO

RH: And they hear clergy who say, "Look, we absolutely want to help you to make the right decisions. And you need to understand that we want you to live. So if the choice between your living or someone else's living is that you've got to go to jail, I'll turn you in tomorrow.

MB: There will be members of the Boston Police there, the State Police, various Federal agencies, the US Attorney, the DA's office -- all the players are there.

VOICE OVER CEASE FIRE FOOTAGE

And each person represents their agency, and lets them know, "This is what we will do if you continue." They know we're serious. Most will stop what they're doing. Those that don't, we take them off the streets. We go after them. And it works.

DARM: But it's a perfect match when you think about it. You're sending all the right signals that if you change your behavior, you don't have to worry about us. But if you don't, there's a reckoning. So that's just one example of being a little more creative, and recognizing that you just can't arrest and indict your way out of the problem.

NEW SECTION

RM: We convinced a lot of these individuals that being crack dealers and being gang members, etc., was not the lifestyle. And they put it back in our lap. And they said, "OK, well now what?" So we felt some responsibility towards reaching out.

TITLE–THE BOSTON JOBS PROJECT: Offering Alternatives

TEXT–The Jobs Project is based upon the realization that the primary deterrent to violence and criminal activity is through providing career-path jobs to youth at risk.

DS: The Boston Jobs Project was built on the premise that if the Streetworkers, the Probation Officers, the cops could identify some hard-core offenders who were appropriate for prosecution–State prosecution, Federal prosecution–these same people might also help identify people who were looking for an alternative.

BOSTON JOBS PROJECT MEETING WITH LIVE AUDIO

PE: There was one detective in particular, Detective Waggett, said, "Last night I sat in a car with a kid I've arrested twice for assault with intent to murder. He's the type of kid, you wouldn't be afraid to take him home to dinner with your family. He just needs hope." He said, "I talked to him about giving up the drug dealing, and he says to me, 'What are you going to do for me? You going to get me a job?'"

BOSTON JOBS PROJECT MEETING WITH LIVE AUDIO

PE: And I said to myself, "You know? I'm the Police Commissioner, I'm not in the jobs business. But, if my best cops are telling me this is where we have to be, well, this is where we're going to go."

BOSTON JOBS PROJECT MEETING WITH LIVE AUDIO

MTM: I think you have to have faith in these kids. A lot of these kids nobody ever worked with, nobody was able to get to them. But somehow we had a program, or they had faith in us, to work with us. It wasn't 100% successful, but I tell you, I bet it was 90% successful. We saved a lot of kids lives.

TITLE–THE BOSTON STRATEGY

MB: The reason why I think it works is because there's trust there. And it's trust that's been built up over the years. There's personal one-on-one contact.

YVSF / TEN POINT HOME VISIT PLANNING MEETING

There's personal relationships that have been built up. Reverend Hammond knows he can call Commissioner Evans and the Commissioner will call him back. And, and they call these guys. I mean, there's personal relationships that have been built up over the years.

JB: You have police officers who would go to the Commissioner, rather than talk about bigger guns as innovations, they start talking to him about job creation as innovations. You have social workers, Streetworkers who talk to their people about the importance of spirituality. And then you have clergy people who say that "we're able to help you and we believe that all kids can be 'saved'". But then there's some kids who need a prison ministry, and we talk about the importance of law enforcement.

YVSF / TEN POINT HOME VISIT FOOTAGE

When we're able to get to those kinds of things and those kinds of collaborations, then the seeds of community are replanted.

DS: It's the people at the ground level who are really getting the work done.

STREETWORKER TALKING WITH NEIGHBORHOOD KIDS

And I think if we've done anything as the leaders, it's to create a climate where people are encouraged to develop those relationships. They don't have to look upstairs, or look over their shoulder, wondering whether this is OK. We've sent a message to all of them; not only is it OK, but we expect that's the way the business is going to be.

PE: If we're going to successfully make sure that we don't have a repeat of the late '80s and early '90s, then we better be about prevention.

SCHOOL CEASE FIRE PRESENTATION

We better be about providing well-educated kids who can go into the job market, providing them with opportunities after school—the Mayor's 2-6 program. There's a real sense of "we don't want to repeat the mistakes of the late '80s and early '90s,

TL: I can talk to a kid till I'm blue in the face on the street corner, but unless I have the resources to plug that individual in, the alternative Ed programs, the recreational centers, the proper health care, the employment, if I don't have those other things to connect individuals with, I have to realize well, how much work can I actually do?

CEASE FIRE PLANNING MEETING

And I have to realize that just because you're on the street level and on the front line doesn't actually mean that you're able to deal with all the problems that families have.

RH: One of the things we often overlook when we talk about the strategy of the Boston miracle is the role that young people themselves played.

FATHERHOOD PROGRAM GRADUATION

Their willingness to lay the weapons down, their willingness to counsel friends to decide that they wanted to go in new directions. Some of that was organized, like the Dorchester Youth Collaborative, or Sociedad Latina, or Team Empowerment, Gang Peace, that really worked on this. And a lot of it was unorganized, just kids who were tired and decided that they wanted to be a part of the solution and not the problem.

DS: Getting the collaboration together, the cooperation, the communication, the trust - - at least for us in Boston -- became the pre-requisite to some of the specific programs, whether it's Operation Cease Fire, or getting police officers and probation officers going out on the streets together.

MONTAGE OF VARIOUS MEETINGS

Those were tactics, those were programs that only worked because the process that led up to it really involved an element of trust and collaboration.

TEXT—In 1996, there were no youth homicides in the city of Boston.

Stopping young people from killing each other was the key achievement of the broad collaborative effort that became The Boston Strategy.

In a real sense, it was only the beginning -- the problems of drugs, guns, and gangs, as well as the social conditions that support them, remain.

But it was an essential first step that allowed people the time and resources to address those more complex fundamental issues.

TITLE--UNLIKELY ALLIANCES

The Story of The Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence

VOICE OVER TITLES:

RF: Now when we have a shooting or a homicide, it's an exception, it's not the rule.

DARM: The statistics show that there's probably a 25-30% increase in the number of businesses. Home prices have not only stabilized, they've gone up.

DS: If I see a police officer, I'll sometimes say, "How's it going? Are things quiet?" And the response is, "You're not going to believe how quiet it is."

GB: The neighborhood is like something you would not believe. You see kids riding bikes, in the park, playing basketball, things that you would never see before.

ER: In this town now, if something breaks ugly, within an hour's time of the bad news, there will be phone calls all across the city.

THE END

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List of Interviewees:

Boston Police Department

- Commissioner Paul F. Evans
- Superintendent in Chief, Ret., Robert Faherty
- Sgt. Robert Merner
- Lt. Det. Gary French
- Det. Tito Whittington
- Ptl. Mark Buchanan
- Ptl. Greg Brown

US Attorney

- US Attorney Donald K. Stern

Suffolk County District Attorney

- Suffolk County DA Ralph Martin

City of Boston

- Mayor Thomas M. Menino

Boston Community Centers

- Tracy Lithcut
- Ernest Hughes

Department of Probation

- Bernie Fitzgerald
- Bill Stewart

Ten Point Coalition

- Rev. Jeffrey L. Brown
- Rev. Ray Hammond
- Rev. Eugene Rivers
- Mark Scott